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Abstract: This paper considers contradictions emerging between two 
concurrent and tacit conceptions of the Olympic ‘legacy’, setting out one 
conception that understands the Games and its legacies as gifts alongside and 
as counterpoint to the prevailing discourse which operates with Olympic assets 
increasingly as commodities.  
The paper critically examines press and governmental discussion of legacy 
and budgets in order to locate these in the context of a wider discussion 
contrasting ‘gift’ and ‘commodity’ Olympics – setting anthropological 
conceptions of gift-based sociality as a necessary supplement to contractual 
and dis-embedded socio-economic organisational assumptions underpinning 
the commodity-Olympics. The paper suggests consequences of a failure to 
adequately articulate and manage relationships between ‘gift’ and 
‘commodity’ for ambitions towards establish a lasting socio-economic and 
cultural legacy emerging from London 2012.  
Cost-benefit planning and economic realism is central to modern city building 
and mega event delivery: however this paper considers the insufficiency of 
cost-benefit economism as the exclusive paradigm within which to frame and 
manage a dynamic socio-economic and cultural legacy from the 2012 Olympic 
and Paralympic Games. 
Introduction 
Legacy has assumed a considerable significance to the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), host cities and governments over recent decades. This paper 
identifies the ambitious social-economic legacy sought for East London and examines, 
in particular, the consequences of reconciling this ambition with recent public concern 
over the cost of the Games. We propose that it is only possible to achieve productive 
reconciliation of these ends and ambitions through re-framing the conceptualisation of 
the Games as a catalyst of urban renewal.  
Contemporary government policy and business and academic literature tend to focus 
upon cost/benefit approaches to evaluate the impact of the Games upon East London 
and the wider economy. Such approaches are derived from marginalist economics and 
are consistent with the currently fashionable public/private partnership ‘models’ of 
working between the state and private enterprise. The dominance of such ways of 
thinking merely affirms the process of commodification of the Olympics that has 
occurred over recent decades and, most importantly, serves to subordinate ideas of 
‘city-building’ to the exigencies of the market and the direction of the state. ‘Good 
city building’, if it is to be catalysed by a mega event, demands a different perspective 
on the Games and the marketplace that it currently serves.                
The proposed reframing examines two modes of social and economic 
relationship, both of which are enacted in modern Olympism through its association 
with programmes of urban regeneration and city building. The first and dominant is 
the “commodity-mode”, typically reflected in cost-benefit economism. A secondary 
mode is also in evidence as 2012 approaches – which imbricate IOC and other 
cultural discourses of Olympism. The “gift-mode” describes a conception of the 
nature and impact of an Olympic economy embedded in socio-cultural life and 
relations – notably in the various accumulations and effects corralled under the term 
‘legacy’ – a term which owes its semantic potency to socially embedded (familial) 
economies. 
Examining press-based reporting, governmental and delivery authority policy 
statements and other cultural conceptions of ‘Olympism’, ‘legacy’ and ‘the Olympic 
economy’; and with close attention paid to the specificities of the 2012 budget and its 
contexts, we distinguish the tensions and anxieties attaching to and emerging from the 
necessities of operating a “commodity-Olympics” in the space of a “gift-Olympics”.  
The Olympic ‘brand’ and the gift will also be discussed – with an analysis positing 
branding as a daily version of the (fantasised) transformation of commodity relations 
into human/gift relations. It is argued that this transformation leads to the routinised 
absorption of the ‘real’ Olympic movement into the commodified, ‘fantasy world’ of 
the Olympic brand. Gregory draws out the distinction in a useful way: 
Commodity exchange is an exchange of alienable objects between people who 
are in a state of reciprocal independence that establishes a quantitative 
relationship between the objects transacted, whereas gift exchange is an 
exchange of inalienable objects between people who are in a state of 
reciprocal dependence that establishes a qualitative relationship between the 
subjects transacting. (Gregory 1983) 
The contribution  illustrates the conflicting political, social and personal 
relations entailed in thinking, managing and delivering both a “legacy” and a “profit” 
– the elusive ‘Olympic Gold’ sought by organisers, politicians, communities and 
sponsors  - not to mention athletes. We argue that the ‘golden legacy’ of 2012, if it is 
to be delivered through the vectors afforded by the Games, requires sensitivity to the 
‘mixed economies’ of commodity and gift. The fate of, and prospects for, a 2012 
‘legacy’  are imperilled in proportion to the extent to which the commodity modality 
dominates the gift  and where their socio-economic dynamics are unthought and 
ungoverned. We draw on a number of sources (1) in order to argue that legacy – or 
‘legacy momentum’ (2) -  is predicated upon and assured by governance processes 
sensitive to the tensions in operation between ‘commodity Olympism’ and ‘gift 
Olympism. This dialogism is placed at risk by the primacy of a foreclosing discourse 
of contractual-relations that permeates both economic and cultural life in the mega 
project that is London 2012.  
‘Cost Benefit’ Games 
On January 29
th
 2008, the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
met to discuss ‘London 2012’ with Tessa Jowell, the government minister with 
responsibility for the Games and London. The committee was questioning 
government ministers, civil servants and  2012 officers for the fourth time about the 
Games in a little over three months. On opening the meeting, the Chair, John 
Whittingdale MP, immediately raised the main issue:  
‘Chairman: Thank you. Inevitably, we are going to get into the money 
quite rapidly. Can I turn to Helen Southworth’(3). 
The committee’s concerns about ‘the money’ reflected a wider media and public 
interest in the cost of the Games, an interest that was stirred, in particular, by 
government announcements in March 2007 that the cost of the Games was set to rise 
from an initial estimate of £2.4 billion to a revised budget of £9.3 billion. The 
additional money was to be raised through a further commitment by government of £6 
billion (including £2.2 billion from the national lottery, of which £675 million was 
extra funding). The revised costs were driven by several factors including the rising 
price of land remediation, the increased allocation to contingency, tax (the imposition 
of VAT) and the rising costs of security. To address this cost problem, government 
and the Mayor of London, committed in November 2007, to the sale of Park land 
post-2012 to offset any deficits that might arise from the event not covering its costs. 
Hence Helen Southworth’s interest in the rigour of the business planning for 2012 and 
the form that the agreement between government departments might take to ensure 
the ‘realisation of assets’ to pay back the monies owed to the lottery fund;     
Q432 Helen Southworth: This is something you will understand 
absolutely, Minister, that those of us from outside London have a very 
particular interest in. Can I ask you if you can focus around the new 
memorandum of understanding which is setting out some of the processes 
by which Lottery monies will be repaid from the benefits of realisation of 
assets rather than profits. Could you actually take us through some of 
those things? We are very particularly interested in how focused 
organisation is currently on having a very robust business planning 
process to ensure that there is an actual return on assets, that the amounts 
are delivered and that the memorandum will actually operate, that it is not 
going to be a gentleman's agreement that starts disappearing into the 
future. First of all, how robust is the business planning going to be to 
ensure that there is a return? Secondly, how guaranteed is it that that is 
actually going to be paid and we are going to see the benefit of it?(4) 
The words used by Helen Southworth to interrogate the Minister reflects a broader 
consensus amongst many business and academic authors on how best to evaluate the 
economics of the 2012 Games. In turn, the Minister,  Tessa Jowell’s reply responded 
reassuringly on the ‘rigour’ of the business case whilst also indicating that the social 
or regeneration ‘legacy’ of the Games could also accommodated within the 
framework of the business model: 
 ‘Tessa Jowell: Let me take that in two parts. First, the robustness of the 
assumptions and therefore the business case on which the agreement about 
disbursement was then reached between me and the Mayor. The LDA 
undertook through the work of a surveying and estate agency which has a 
national reputation an assessment of trends in land prices and they 
concluded that there was a likely range by the time at which land would 
be available for sale after 2012 of between £800 million, the most 
pessimistic case, and £3.2 billion, the most optimistic case. Again, based 
on the increase in land values over the last 20 years, of which the average 
has been 19.5 per cent, we went for the midpoint, which by general 
agreement is a prudent and realistic assumption. So our assumption about 
the return from the sale of the land is £1.8 billion. In relation to how that 
will be repaid, because it is our intention that the Lottery should be 
reimbursed for the £675 million most recent diversion, which is currently 
being considered by the House, the agreement is that the first tranche, 
£650 million, will be repaid to the LDA, which is the cost of land 
acquisition. Seventy-five per cent of the next tranche, £531 million, from 
memory, will go to the Lottery and 25 per cent to the LDA. From the third 
tranche, 25 per cent will come back to the Lottery, completing the 
repayment of the Lottery, and the remainder will go to the LDA and of 
course, it is the LDA's intention that that money is used for the further 
regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley, so for the construction of more 
homes in the development of the community that will be a very important 
part of the legacy there’(5).    
 
The exchange in the House of Commons DCMS Committee is perhaps unsurprising. 
The committee was tasked to investigate the preparation for the Games and the 
implications of government policies toward achieving its objectives and managing 
public funds to meet the Games costs. The exchange does, however, reveal the 
dominance of the ‘business case’ mode of analysis and how regeneration, in this case 
of the Lower Lea Valley, may arise as perhaps a fortunate ‘remainder’ or residual 
consequence of the contractual approach.  Below, this contractual approach to the 
Games as a mega project or event is explored further in order to identify the ways in 
which its association with regeneration is currently perceived in the debates over the 
economics of London 2012. 
 
The London 2012 Bid 
 
In 2002, a consultancy company, ARUP was commissioned by the government to 
provide a report on the capacity for London to host the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 
Games. A summary report was published in May 2002 and provided a financial 
analysis of the cost of hosting the event. Consistent with the cost/benefit approach, the 
analysis focused upon the costs and income for bidding, preparing and staging the 
Games, provision for risk and ‘an estimation of the residual values of the assets 
created’ (6). The report estimated total expenditure to be £1.79 billion with income 
estimated at £1.3 billion, leaving a shortfall of about half a billion pounds that could 
be reduced significantly according to ARUP, since the report’s authors had been 
conservative in their estimates of income. The government established a cabinet sub-
committee, to examine the ARUP report and requested a senior civil servant to review 
carefully ARUP’s estimation of costs. The civil servant, Robert Raine, found the 
ARUP report to underestimate costs by about £800 million. A revised figure of $3.8 
billion (£2.4 billion) was eventually agreed and that figure was submitted in the 
Candidate File to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by the London bid team 
(7): 
 
‘The UK Government, the Mayor of London and the BOA have created a 
successful partnership to oversee the preparation by London 2012 of London’s 
bid. Support from national, regional and local government is detailed below. 
This support includes a funding package for specific Olympic costs from the 
UK Government and the Mayor of London totaling $3.8 billion. National The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer has guaranteed that the UK Government will 
provide all necessary financial support to ensure successful Olympic and 
Paralympic Games. This includes: 
• Acting as ultimate guarantor of the construction costs of infrastructure, venues 
and facilities necessary to hold the Games  
• Ensuring that funds are made available from the $3.8 billion funding package 
to pre-finance the LOCOG’s expenditure prior to receiving Games revenue 
• Bearing the cost of providing security, medical and other Government-related 
services for the Games. Legislation is currently progressing through Parliament 
that will enable up to $2.4 billion of National Lottery revenue to be used 
towards the preparation and delivery of the Games. The UK Government will 
bring forward legislation to ensure the delivery of the Games by creating the 
ODA, and to align UK legislation with IOC requirements, for example by 
introducing strict regulations to counter ambush marketing, as soon after July 
2005 as possible (as detailed in sections 3.3 and 3.5)’.(8) 
 
The successful London bid primarily based its financial estimates on the costs 
required to fund the event. The £2.4 billion did not include the non-event related 
expenditures required to enable East London to host the Games – these infrastructure 
costs were, in part, already committed by government as a component of the 
infrastructure development of the wider Thames Gateway and, in particular, the 
completion of the Eurostar high speed train project with its upgraded Stratford station 
located adjacent to the proposed Olympic park..  The complementarity of regional 
regeneration plans with the proposal to locate the Games in an Olympic Park centred 
in East London provided a compelling, technically strong, bid.  
 
The bid’s success was widely attributed to the commitment to locating the Games in a 
deprived area of East London, with the regeneration theme appealing to an IOC that 
was chastened by the Olympic movement’s recent history of being criticised for its 
embrace of commercialism - especially in the wake of the Atlanta 1996 Games. The 
London bid appeared to draw inspiration from Barcelona (1992), a city that had 
successfully allied social regeneration and economic development to its hosting of the 
Games (9). London’s success, however, has subsequently revealed the hazards 
associated with combining schemes for urban regeneration and renewal with a bid to 
host a mega event. Some of these hazards are identified below; they constitute the 
ingredients for the complex interplay of the concepts of the ‘gift’ and ‘commodity’ 
economies – and the likely subordination of the former to the latter in the context of 
the contemporary UK economy. 
 
The Hazards of the Regeneration Game(s) 
 
The programme of urban regeneration associated with hosting the 2012 Games is 
perhaps the most ambitious for a host city in the history of the modern Olympics. East 
London’s status as the poor relation to the West of the city has long historical roots in 
the industrialisation and urban expansion of the city. Historically, the East housed the 
city’s working class and employment and economic activity relied heavily upon the 
docks and the manufacturing industries that spread around them. The closure of the 
docks and the demise of manufacturing in the area in the 1970s and 1980s reinforced 
the divide between the rich west and the poor east. The Docklands development, 
initiated in the 1980s, was designed to extend the more dynamic service sector, 
especially financial service industries, into the East. The development – mainly 
focused upon the Isle of Dogs and, in particular, Canary Wharf -, though subject to 
boom-bust-boom, eventually achieved its stated goals. It extended the financial centre 
of the city eastwards and provided a boost to mainly private sector housing 
development with many luxury homes attracting the relocation of professional 
dwellers. The future of London as a global centre for financial services was secured. 
The development, initiated in the neo-liberal climate of the 1980s, did little, however, 
to address the underlying social problems of East London. Indeed, critics have rightly 
argued that the Docklands development has served to reinforce the polarisation 
between rich and poor communities in East London (10).   
 
It is precisely this divide that the organisers of 2012 claim to address; with the legacy 
of the Games being linked to challenging the underlying social and economic 
problems of East London - the skills deficit, worklessness, health inequalities and the 
lack of available and affordable housing for local people. In addition to these social 
objectives, the Olympic Park construction seeks to be a showcase for environmental 
and sustainable development. Government, the Mayor of London and the London 
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) have published a significant 
number of policy documents containing promises and pledges relating to achieving a 
positive social, economic, cultural and environmental legacy (11). When allied to the 
local council’s plans for the development of ‘Stratford City’ a public/private funded 
initiative aimed at constructing a new housing and retail centre adjacent to the 
Olympic Park, the programme of regeneration for the Lower Lea Valley area almost 
achieves the scale of creating a new town: 
 
‘Stratford City...will result in one of the largest mixed-use developments 
in the UK for many years to come. Covering 73 hectares of largely 
derelict land, the next 15 years will see the creation of a new £4bn 
metropolitan centre in East London, with more than 100 shops, three big 
department stores, cafés, schools, hotels, parks and health centres. There 
will be a new commercial district with landmark towers and new leisure 
facilities, all in a quality setting with water features. New urban districts 
will house an extra 11,000 residents and 30,000 workers. It will also 
house most of the 2012 Olympic athletes’ (11). 
 
 
As the promises and policies relating to achieving a ‘sustainable legacy’ have been 
elaborated by government, regeneration agencies and 2012 organisers over the past 
two years, the costs associated with the 2012 Games have, it seems, soared. At the 
same time, legacy aspirations have been firmly placed within the nexus of the 
‘cost/benefit’, commodity economy for several reasons. 
 
First, the evolution of the IOCs approach to the bidding process for hosting the Games 
has shifted focus away from the ‘Disney-world’ model of the commercialisation of 
the mega event toward a more nuanced, socially responsible, attachment to economic 
development and urban renewal. This distancing from the commodity Games (Los 
Angeles 1984) has been reflected in candidate files and the IOCs own evaluation 
process for the Games, the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) study. Second, 
prospective host cities have incorporated social goals into bids without undertaking 
the detailed tasks associated with evaluating such large scale projects. The bids are 
designed to win the competition, the reconciliation of aspirations set down in the 
candidate file with the financial framework required to deliver them really 
commences after the winning city is announced. The potential gap between aspiration 
and reality is filled, according to IOC regulations, by guarantees underwritten by the 
host city and nation governments. The bidding process itself creates the capacity for 
the confusion of event and non-direct event related investment. - the former being 
expenditure related to putting the event on and the latter being the investment in 
infrastructure that may strengthen the bid but not be attributable to meeting its direct 
costs.  
 
Finally, the partnership of political institutions and agencies that are formed to put on 
the event attach social, economic, cultural and environmental goals to their bid to win 
domestic public support and, most importantly, legitimate the expenditure required to 
host a ‘gigantic’ Games. The social dimensions of legacy are caught in the gap 
between aspiration and affordability. Paradoxically, the IOCs concern to contain the 
commercialisation of the Games, in practice, ensures that the process of city-building 
or urban regeneration is ‘commodified’ within a specific spatial and temporal context, 
typically in circumstances where the host city population has little capacity for 
democratic intervention in shaping the outcomes of the regeneration process itself 
(12). Below we examine these ‘hazards’ in relation to the experience to date of 
London 2012. 
    
A  National Audit Office Report into the risk assessment and management of the 2012 
Games (2007) identifies the non-event related infrastructure costs (£9.9 billion) and 
specifies an additional sum (£1.04 billion) set aside by government for non-Olympic 
related infrastructure costs arising from construction work in the Olympic Park that 
was required to regenerate the area even if the Games was not taking place. In 
particular, this expenditure involved the costs associated with moving overhead power 
lines underground and the construction of bridges, tunnels and roadways, the costs for 
which were designated as ‘75 percent Olympic and 25 percent non-Olympic’ (13) : 
 
‘43 The Candidate File described capital investment for venues and 
facilities, Olympic Park infrastructure, and roads and railways, which was 
to be financed by a combination of the public sector funding package to 
the 
extent that the work was Olympic related (for Olympic related costs see 
paragraph 70), and further contributions from the public and private 
sectors. The costs were estimated in pounds sterling and converted into 
US dollars 
for the Candidate File, using an exchange rate of £1=$1.6. The Candidate 
File showed that the capital investment amounted to $15.8 billion (£9.9 
billion) and stated that funding for some $11 billion of this total related 
to transport investments for which funding was already committed at the 
time of the bid.’. 
 
44 In May 2003 the Government and the Mayor of London agreed a 
memorandum of understanding which provided for a ‘public sector 
funding package’ of up to £2.375 billion to meet the costs of the Olympic 
and 
Paralympic Games (Figure 5). The Government is also to provide £1.044 
billion towards the costs of ‘non-Olympic’ infrastructure (see paragraph 
71) on the site of the Olympic Park.  
 
The additional cost attributed to the Olympic Park (£1.04 billion) caused the 
government to announce a revision to the Games budget in 2006, a revision that 
amounted to an increase from £2.4 billion to £3.4 billion. By 2007, a further revision 
was announced to include  contingency (£2.747 billion), £836 million for tax, a rise in 
security costs to £600 million, an increase in the Olympic Development  Authority’s 
programme delivery budget from £16 to £570 million and a decrease (from £738 to 
£165 million) in the anticipated private sector contribution toward meeting the costs 
of the Games. The consequence of these adjustments was that the public sector funds 
available to meet the costs of the Games and associated infrastructure development 
were required to increase by about £4.7 billion net (15), including £2.7 billion 
contingency. The ‘gap’ of between £2 and £4 billion in the public funding estimated 
to be needed at the time of the bid and that required by spring 2007 was primarily 
attributable to the underestimation of tax (VAT – a cost to the Games paid out by 
government but returned to the Exchequer) and the poor initial assessment of security 
costs, Park remediation costs and the expenditure associated with the logistics costs of 
the ODA (the initial budget for ODA costs had been estimated as if it were a small 
Urban Development Corporation, the complexity of delivering the project 
management for the Games was ignored). 
 
The ‘technically’ polished London bid was deeply flawed in relation to estimating 
clearly identifiable event-related costs, including contingency and the attribution of 
tax; the expenditure required to clean-up the highly contaminated Park land was also, 
more understandably, under-estimated. Such errors, however, are not unusual in the 
planning and construction of major projects and mega events, especially when such 
events are related to a wider process of urban regeneration or development as the 
Beijing and Athens Games have revealed. Event-related and infrastructure costs in 
Beijing, for example, have, according to several estimates, exceeded the bid book by 
over $20 billion and, as a recent study of mega projects and risk has revealed, across 
the world nine out of every ten transport infrastructure project costs exceed initial 
estimated costs by between 50 and 100 percent (16).  
 
A benign observer could suggest that the overall event and non-event related 
infrastructure costs of hosting the Olympics and developing a part of East London – a 
figure of around £18 billion, including a cost overrun of approximately £5 billion - 
places the ‘2012’ mega-project at the lower end of spectrum of the ‘calamitous history 
of cost overruns’(17). This was not, however, the interpretation or response typically 
to be found in the UK media. The initial acclaim arising from the UK’s successful bid 
was quickly replaced by articles critical of the uncertainties surrounding the budget, 
the continuous revisions of budget costs by government and the elaboration of more 
specific criticisms of the costs associated with the creation of the widely derided 
Olympic logo, the design and cost of the Olympic Park sporting arenas, the salary 
costs of LOCOG senior staff and, by early 2008, the revised estimates of land values 
emerging from the economic problems posed by the credit crunch. One journalist 
from the popular press summed up much of the media’s perspective on the Games and 
‘money’ in concluding that Olympic funding had gone from ‘joke to scandal’ (18):     
 
Ken's Gold muddle 
Paul Routledge 18/01/2008 Daily Mirror  
London’s Mayor Ken Livingstone has dropped the 2012 Olympics into a 
billion pound black hole. He has overestimated the value of sporting 
facility land that can be sold when the event finishes. So the £9.3bn costs 
will climb even higher. Olympic funding has gone from joke to scandal. 
The nation is being ripped off years before a single race has been run. In 
July, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the 1948 London Games. 
Those Olympics cost £761,888 (£77million in today's money) and they 
made a profit of £29,420 (£3m today). Times are different, I know. But 
that was a real Labour government, not one conned rigid by the money 
men. 
 
From the arguments of countless media articles to the critical reports of parliamentary 
select committees, the rising costs associated with hosting the 2012 Olympics have 
come to dominate public discussion about the Games and its eventual legacy.  The 
discourse has been conducted entirely within the framework of the commodity 
economy, with many concluding that the costs outweigh the benefits of hosting the 
event. This hostile press and public criticism from politicians has gathered a 
considerable momentum in the UK over the past two years, despite the IOC’s 
generally positive evaluations of London’s preparations, evaluations informed by the 
IOCs own values of ‘Olympism’.   
 
The Olympic ‘Family’ and Olympism 
 
The IOC evokes the attributes of an alternative, socially responsible approach to 
hosting the Olympic Games, adopting the language of the gift economy. The 
Olympics is not merely a global sporting event but one that projects universal human 
values that promotes, for example, cultural exchange, educational development and 
international understanding as major components of the participation in the world’s 
leading sporting event. Such values are represented in the ethos of the Olympic 
‘family’.  
It is within the family that theorists of the gift economy observe the origins of an 
alternative to the commercial economy. The commercial economy is based upon the 
alienation of labour, the creation of commodities and their exchange as equivalents in 
the marketplace; this exchange masks a deeply unequal social relationship inherent in 
the process of their production. By contrast, the family is the location in which 
alienation through exchange is replaced by social bonds arising from the conferment 
not of commodities but of ‘gifts’ which do not require reciprocity and which enable 
social bonds to be forged across generations. Obligation is not defined by a 
commercial contract but arises from social interactions that confer authenticity and 
social regard or respect – non-market related attributes of positive human relations 
(19).  
 
The IOCs evocation of the ‘family’ and the mutuality of its social relations is central 
to the philosophy of modern Olympism. Olympism, however, seeks to transfer this 
mutuality from the family to civil society. It is in this process that the IOC and the 
wider Olympic movement has created a simulation of the gift economy within the 
context of a highly commercialised or commodified form; simulation is now 
represented in the form of the Olympic ‘brand’. The brand is purchased by sponsors 
who in turn receive the right to the use of the Olympic logo. The ‘gift’ of sponsorship 
provides the basis for the contractual obligations to be set between host cities and the 
IOC; sponsorship is an important source of income to offset the cost of staging the 
Games. In turn, over recent Games, sponsors have engaged with both commercial 
(Atlanta 1996) and social and environmental agendas (Sydney 2000, London 2012), 
to influence decisions about legacy and achieve competitive advantage through the 
promotion of their adherence to programmes of social responsibility.  
The Olympics becomes a vehicle for enterprise to practice ‘pseudo regard’ whilst the 
underlying contractual obligations between host city, national government, the IOC 
and enterprise exact an increasing hold over the wider process of urban development 
and city building. The discourse of city building is trapped in the immediacy of 
reciprocity (costs and benefits) to the exclusion of the ‘gift’ – the transformative 
character of which is premised upon the passing between groups, group members and 
generations building and elaborating social capital, rather than the immediacy 






 July 2005 – when “London” -  when “we” were (genuinely) surprised by 
being given the 2012 Olympics, sticks in the mind as one of those moments of 
collective euphoria that cannot quite be properly explained retrospectively. The 
scenes in Trafalgar Square were echoed in Stratford and elsewhere, and even while 
the euphoria was tragically cut short, the terrorist attacks on 7
th
 July did not long 
delay the angry or anxious backlash: the holding to account, the popular articulations 
of refusal or indifference and the scepticism about the distribution of the Olympic 
‘gold’. The recipient of the gift becomes the Host – and the host, as recipient of the 
gift soon becomes one who is required to give in turn. As Lewis Hyde (2006) 
intimates: The gift must keep on moving [20] 
 
The transformational nature of the (dynamic) gift is at the heart of a number of 
accounts of ‘bounty’ which comes as a reward, but also as a trial or test for the 
protagonists of folktales. Hyde (2006) builds a compelling synthesis of myths and 
theories of gifts as ‘transformative’ and creative interventions in individual and 
collective life. While the folk and fairy tales he cites hardly constitute sociological 
evidence, his line of argument is traced equally through the detailed anthropological 
fieldwork of Malinowski as well as accounts from Marcel Mauss [21] and Marshall 
Sahlins. His central proposition (that unlike the commodity, “the gift keeps on 
moving”), synthesised from his eclectic range of academic and folkloric sources 
provides a powerful critique of the commodity as a static; an exhausted and 
exhausting modality for human and social relations – lacking narrative and futurity. 
Eliptically Hyde’s argument, derived from his general account of cultural creatoivity 
– offers a relevant set of insights for thinking about the ‘movement’ / momentum (or 
otherwise) of the Olympic ‘gift’: of legacy. 
 
In folktales the gift is often something seemingly worthless – ashes or coals or 
leaves or straw – but when the puzzled recipient carries it to his doorstep, he 
finds it has turned to gold. Typically in increase inheres in the gift only so long 
as it is treated as such – as soon as the happy mortal starts to count it or grabs 
his wheelbarrow and heads back for more, the gold reverts to straw. The 
growth is in the sentiment; it can’t be put on the scale. [22] 
 
There is some value in Hyde’s analysis in opening up thinking about the desire for 
and anxiety about Olympic “Gold”, not least because Olympism stakes its claim as 
connected to a (no doubt mythologized) ancient past – of ritual and collective 
solidarities. The Modern Olympics constitute a mega event and, as such, and in their 
scale, perhaps speak more of modernity, or, to follow Auge “supermodernity” [23] 
than of the ancient festivals of religion, sport and culture from which they derive their 
name. Nevertheless, as Philostartis describes a component of the ancient Games 
 
When the people of Elis had sacrificed, then the ambassadors of the Greeks, 
whoever happened to be there, were expected to offer a sacrifice [24]  
 
It is clear that the Olympic festivals were in some respects reminiscent of some of the 
pre-modern gifting ceremonies that inform Hyde’s and others’ anthropological 
accounts of gift economies [25]. Notwithstanding the tenuousness of such telescopic 
‘history’ - the Games explicit engagements with the languages of familial connection, 
community building, regeneration and, lately, legacy, constructs (if it does not affirm) 
a genealogy connecting the Games more precisely to gift-economies – and their 
‘powers’ of cultural restoration / regeneration – and more than  other types of mega 
events (expos/world fairs and or even extended tournaments, such as the world cup or 
national sports festivals such as Superbowl) which are unashamedly festivals of the 
commodity [26].  The passing of the Olympic flame – the ‘spirit’ in which the 
Olympic asset is at once enshrined and let free/passed on - from hand to hand – from 
host to host - is the most potent symbol of this aspiration and it ritualises Hyde’s 
maxim that: ..the gift must always move. As Hyde argues: 
 
There are other forms of property that stand still, that mark a boundary or 
resist momentum, but the gift keeps going [27] (Hyde 2006:4 itals in orig.)  
 
Even without this antecedent connection to such ritualism and collective and public 
sacrifice and feasting, the Olympics – as both a “brand” and a “movement” - poses for 
us the dichotomy of gift and commodity exchange – a prominent articulation of a 
dichotomy that (as Frow [28] and others have argued), is constitutive within 
contemporary everyday life.  
 
We are not arguing for the Olympics to become a kind of public gift/sacrifice 
(a  national endowment upon the East End of London[29] from a beneficent 
government and the IOC. But we are suggesting that an foregrounding 
acknowledgement of the necessarily hybrid (gift/commodity) Olympics – and the 
legacy entailed to the Games (in anticipation) – is a worthwhile precursor and 
ongoing gloss on thinking and planning for the kinds and types of public and private 
investment around 2012; and, also, for better assuring the social character and 
modalities of disbursement / accumulation that can be hoped for and facilitated under 
the headings ‘Olympic’ and ‘legacy’. It is to the extent that the ‘gift-mode’ is to the 
fore that the Games might induce a dynamic and transformational set of legacies – 
tangible and intangible – whereby the definition of the Olympic ‘Good’ is informed in 
accountabilities to (local) community and political visions and imperatives, rather less 
than in the accountabilities of …accountancy 
 
There is inevitably a co-mingling of “gift” and “commodity”- centred conceptions of 
the Olympics. Arjun Appadurai [30] warns against “exaggeration and reification of 
the contrast between gift and commodity”, pointing at anthropological writings in 
particular. Certainly it is important to acknowledge a degree of necessary 
“concurrency” (if that is the right word) across and between these two modalities of 
exchange and engagement. The modes are hard to conceive of in isolation from their 
shadow opposites. Frow comments that social life is permeated by just this tension: 
 
the realm of the everyday is the place where, through the constant 
transformation of commodity relations into gift relations, it becomes difficult 
to hold the two terms in their categorical purity [31]  
 
However we argue that this necessary hybridity can be acknowledged without 
accepting, as Appadurai seems to, Bourdieu’s insistence that  
 
practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even where it gives 
every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the logic of interested 
calculation (in the narrow sense) and playing for stakes that are non-material 
and not easily quantified” [32]  
 Even if this is the case, and as Mauss proposes – there is a value in keeping open the 
space of the gift as a significant and qualitatively different order of activity, since to 
not do so  - to too readily collapse the distinctions between narrow contractualism 
(driven by money) and variously elaborated reciprocities and engagement – driven by 
gratitude –or the “erotic life” (as Hyde puts it), of ‘the gift’, is, we argue, to foreclose 
the (optimistic) possibility of a genuine accumulation of social and collective benefit 
from the 2012 Games for London.  Mauss makes a general point in his classic 
examination of The Gift which is timely prescient in the run up to this, our 21
st
  
century version of a ancient festival transplanted from Athenian society: 
 
It is a good thing possibly that there exist means of expenditure and exchange 
other than economic ones…I believe that we must become, in proportion as 
we would develop our wealth, something more than better financiers, 
accountants and administrators. The mere pursuit of individual ends is harmful 
to the ends and peace of the whole, to the rhythm of its work and pleasures, 
and hence in the end to the individual [33] 
 
The Olympics project awakens an anxiety about what it is that ‘survives’ and what 
‘withers’ outside the spreadsheets and forecasting technologies through which, often 
with impressive efficiency, and sometimes not, the abstract vision – of a stadium, a 
cultural venue or a piece of restored land – materialises. Indeed the very materiality – 
the quality of the space – opened up by the Olympics – is, we argue, a matter partly of 
the successful and integrative conjunction of modalities of provision and 
appropriation (gift and commodity) that will underpin them. The commodification of 
space in regeneration is a problem explored in detail by, for instance, Graham and 
Marvin in their excellent Splintering Urbanism thesis [34] 
 2012 has become a part of the everyday lives of many Londoners, and, will be so for 
many more as the Games approach, notably as volunteers give up their time and 
labour to the successful running of the event. We argue the planning, delivery and 
conceiving of the Games (and not just its anticipation) should be actively cultivated as 
a component part of the time/space of the East London everyday - to stay “in touch” 
in its pristine “figured” [35] future in just that way that undoubtedly the yet-to-be- 
refiguring ad disfiguring processes of construction are ‘in touch’ with the inhabitants 
of the five boroughs. The Olympic infrastructure – the facilities and the park must not 
become redundant – everyone is agreed on that. It is the truism of legacy planning. 
But there are modes of use, modes of engagement which, to reiterate, materialise in 
the contexts of entailed provisioning and appropriation i.e. the instituted  give and 
take of the facility at hand.  
 
Conclusion: The Park and the Gift 
 
The assumptions of market exchange may not necessarily lead to an 
emergence of boundaries, but they do in practice. [36]  
 
In Barcelona the Olympic park stands as a monument to the legacy of the games. It is 
both a symbolic and functional component of the cityscape and of its everyday life. It 
has a function for tourism and for place-making. It is of the city – part of the fabric of 
Barcelona. Other event venues at other games have attracted the dreaded “white 
elephant” tag.  We think ‘use’ and non ‘use’ do not adequately get to the point. 
Utilitarianism provides necessary but not sufficient criteria for evaluating legacy. Just 
as the usefulness of the gift does not fulfil or exhaust its function. The closing off of a 
utility from its communities might ensure use – but if the privatisation of the gift 
means that accessibility is a matter for only a few who can afford premium prices – 
the utility will mask significant exclusion. Which is to say that if we witness a 
primarily commodity-Olympics the park will become a series of splintered fragments 
within the urban realm and the gift-based catalytic effects will not materialise. The 
gift will cease to move. The Olympic park, site of memory and the evolving 
history/legacy of London’s games will become instead a non-place.  
 
There are two concepts from Auge which help to develop our argument. One is this 
well known notion of ‘non-place’; the other is his understanding of the kind of 
contractual relating that inheres in a non-place environment: 
 
Clearly the word ‘non-place’ designates two complementary but distinct 
realities: spaces formed in relations to certain ends (transport, transit, 
commerce, leisure), and the relations that individuals have with these spaces. 
Although the two sets of relations overlap to a large extent, and in any case 
officially (individuals travel, make purchases, relax), they are still not to be 
confused with one another; for non-places mediate a whole mass of relations, 
with the self and with others, which are only indirectly connected with their 
purposes. As anthropological places create the organically social, so-non-
places create solitary contractuality [37] (Auge 1995) . 
 
The park – and its extend facilities – extended geographically into the five boroughs, 
and temporally, in the emerging modalities of legacy – risk becoming non-space 
facilities bound to the logics of market exchange. The fear of ‘white elephant’ non-
utilisation – of the commodity not being bought or the gift not being received - might 
encourage those responsible (the LDA) into arrangements whereby the park becomes 
a functional non-space. Will we see the construction of Putnam’s [38] bowling alley 
in the future park? That is one scenario for the commodified utilisation of a corner of 
the post-Games space. 
A governance structure confident to pass the Olympic assets on in part in the mode of 
a gift – and translated into the political economy of contemporary city-building – that 
means in the form of community driven planned public amenity and access to soft 
benefits in the form of skills and training…to carry on giving to the local economy – 
depends upon dialogic reciprocities emergent from open and political processes and 
local engagements. These are a necessary complement to the cost benefit planning 
and project management attached to the delivery of the Games and its legacy. To split 
the two apart (as seems to be happening) in the development phase risks instituting a 
disconnection ‘down the line’ and the stunting of the dynamism of the Olympic gift: 
 
When a gift passes from hand to hand in this spirit, it becomes the binder of 
many wills. What gathers in it is not only the sentiment of generosity but the 
affirmation of individual goodwill, making of those separate parts a spiritus 
mundi, a unanimous heart, a band whose wills are focussed through the lens of 
the gift. Thus the gift becomes the agent of social cohesion, and this again 
leads to the feeling that its passage increases its worth, for in social life at least, 
the whole really is greater than the sum of its parts. [39]  
 
It is the material and redistributive circulation of the Olympic asset – through the 
properly appointed materiality of the legacy assets - that will assure this accumulation 
of positive affect around the Olympic Games.  It is upon such accumulation (amongst 
a number of other things) that a lasting legacy depends.  
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